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THE 'TEXTBOOK GIBSON' 
ABSTRACT 
Ever since Kuhn’s work on scientific revolutions, there has been growing 
recognition of the conservativism of ‘normal science.’ The introductory 
textbooks, as representatives of a discipline, aim to present a consensus, and 
hence are themselves a powerful force for non-change. This article is a case 
study in how the textbooks have dealt with one of psychology’s most eminent 
dissidents, James Gibson (1904-1979). Our review of over a hundred 
textbooks, dating from the 1950s to the present, reveals fundamental and 
systematic misrepresentations of Gibson. Although Gibson continues to figure 
in most of the textbooks, his work is routinely assimilated to theoretical 
positions he had explicitly rejected: cue theory, stimulus-response psychology, 
and nativism. Furthermore, his work has come to be widely represented as a 
complement to traditional psychological theory. In short, this eminent dissident 
has, through a largely unconscious process of assimilation, been transformed 
into a reassuringly mainstream figure, the “Textbook Gibson”. 
Key words: James Gibson, ecological psychology, textbook science, normal 
science 
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THE 'TEXTBOOK GIBSON' 
The introductory textbook is in an obvious sense derivative, and far removed from the 
main sites of scientific knowledge production.  Furthermore, unlike much of the 
‘secondary literature,’ such as literature reviews and advanced handbooks, the 
general textbooks can hardly be expected to cover the relevant primary literature with 
any consistent depth or expertise. 
Nevertheless, despite its derivative status, the psychological textbook is highly 
influential. It is likely to be the first contact students have with the topics covered in 
their courses, and for those students who do not specialize in psychology (i.e. the 
majority in the USA), the only psychological text they are likely to read or own. As 
such, the introductory textbook serves as an important representative of psychology, 
and not just to students, but also to the wider world.  
The format of the textbook is itself highly potent. The order of the chapter headings 
(which has remained largely unchanged over several decades) sends implicit yet 
influential messages about what is supposed to be fundamental or ‘hard’ science, and 
what, in contrast, is ‘soft’ and tentative.  The chapters on sensory and physiological 
psychology occur at the beginning, whereas social and ‘applied psychology’ (should 
that appear at all) come somewhere towards the end. Even the style of writing and 
choice of graphical representations can be highly persuasive about the 
conclusiveness (or otherwise) of the findings and theories being reviewed (Smith, 
Best, Stubbs, Bastiani & Roberson-Nay, 2002; Smith, Best, Stubbs, Johnston & 
Bastiani 2000; Smyth, 2001). 
Clearly, given the range of different areas that the textbooks have to cover, there is 
an inevitable risk of superficiality and inaccuracy, a problem compounded by the habit 
of some textbook writers to recycle one another’s material. (Kagan, 2006, pp. 66-68, 
has provided an account of such plagiarism on an industrial scale.) However, there is 
also the temptation or perhaps obligation to disregard or downplay important divisions 
within the discipline. A consensus about the need for consensus seems to have been 
established early within psychology (see Pillsbury, 1911, p. vii.). Misrepresentation by 
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THE 'TEXTBOOK GIBSON' 
the textbook writers is thus not just a reflection of superficiality or carelessness, but 
also motivated by a desire to convey a sense of shared discplinary values and 
agendas (Brush, 1974; Costa & Shimp, 2011; Lubek, 1993; see also Blumenthal, 
1991). “Shadow history” (Watson, 1993) plays an important role here, where a 
discipline recreates its history to conform to current ideals and concerns.  Kuhn 
(1963), who drew a sharp contrast between creative science and routine ‘normal’ 
science, actually approved of such ‘textbook’ science, at least for the majority of 
students destined to become ‘normal’ scientists (Kuhn, 1962, p. 20). However, as 
Nersessian (2003) has demonstrated, ‘textbook’ science downplays the importance of 
tacit knowledge and creativity even in normal science. “Much of the credit for the 
success in creating practitioners goes to the apprenticeship … during which practices 
are learned in authentic situations” (Nersesian, 2003, p. 189). 
If ‘textbook’ science is not merely misleading about normal science, how does it deal 
with radical dissidence? As Kuhn (1962) famously argued, normal science is highly 
resistant to revolutionary change. Psychology has had its fair share of notable 
dissidents, such as David Bakan (1969), and Sigmund Koch (1999), but they are 
seldom mentioned in the textbooks. One important dissident who could not easily be 
ignored is B. F. Skinner,1 and he has certainly been subject to “steady
misrepresentation” (see Todd & Morris, 1992). Skinner’s relation to mainstream 
psychology, however, is complicated. His immediate followers isolated themselves 
within their own field of behavior analysis (Krantz, 1971, 1972; Coleman & Mehlman, 
1992).  Furthermore, Skinner was known within and beyond psychology mainly 
through his popular writings, and these often contradicted the logic of his own theory 
(see Costall, 1996; see also Scharff, 1982). We will be concerned with a more 
centrally placed dissident, James Gibson (1904-1979). 
JAMES GIBSON, AN EMINENT DISSIDENT 
Gibson’s position in recent American psychology was almost unique. As Harry Levin, 
Thomas Ryan, and Ulric Neisser explained in their Memorial Statement for Cornell 
University, within the field of perceptual research he was “simultaneously its most 
eminent and most dissident member” (cited in E. J. Gibson, 2002, p. 108). Gibson 
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THE 'TEXTBOOK GIBSON' 
remained a prominent figure within psychology throughout his long career.  His early 
experiments on memory for visual form (Gibson, 1929), on perceptual adaptation 
(Gibson, 1933, 1937a & b) and on perceived orientation (Gibson & Mowrer, 1938), 
were widely cited in the important publications of the time, including Koffka’s 
Principles of Gestalt psychology (1935) and Tolman’s Principles of purposive 
behavior (1932), and also in the handbooks of experimental psychology (Woodworth, 
1938; Stevens, 1951; Osgood, 1953). His election to the prestigious Society of 
Experimental Psychologists, in 1939, was the first of many of the highest honours in 
American psychology that he received throughout the course of his long career (see 
E. J. Gibson, 2002; Hochberg, 1994). Gibson’s writings continue to be included in 
compilations of classic contributions to psychological science, including the centenary 
editions of the Psychological Review and The British Journal of Psychology (Gibson, 
1954/1994; 1958/2009; Harré, 1981; Yantis, 2000). 
By the 1940s, however, when he was already a prominent figure, Gibson came to have 
serious doubts about the state of modern psychology. He was convinced that the traditional 
atomistic and artificial approaches to the study of perception were fundamentally mistaken. All 
of the existing theories presupposed that the available information was inherently limited or 
ambiguous and hence required the perceiver to enrich it, or fill in the gaps.  But, as Gibson 
continued to maintain, the existing theories, empiricist, nativist, or rationalist, kept begging the 
question by invoking prior knowledge in order to explain perception: 
Knowledge of the world cannot be explained by supposing that knowledge of the world 
already exists.  All forms of cognitive processing imply cognition to account for 
cognition.  (Gibson, 1979, p. 253). 
Gibson’s criticisms of perceptual theory had - and still have - much wider implications. 
In the 1940s and 1950s, the domain of perceptual research was extensive.  
Questions about the reliability of perception were closely connected with the concerns 
of clinical and social psychologists.  In particular, the topic of social stereotyping was 
a pressing issue, in the light of the rise of fascism in Europe, and the purges of 
suspected communists closer to home. These concerns are very evident in Gibson’s 
early writings (Gibson, 1939; 1953). His first book, The perception of the visual world, 
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THE 'TEXTBOOK GIBSON' 
even makes reference to the Salem witch hunts (Gibson, 1950, p. 211). (Around this 
time, Gibson was having his own experience of ‘witch hunts.’) Although, the scope of 
perceptual research has become much more restricted in more recent psychology, 
Gibson’s criticism of representationalist theories of perception nevertheless came to 
have wider relevance once representationalism became the dominant mode of 
theorizing within psychology in general. 
Gibson regarded the problems in perceptual theory as reflecting the wider precarious 
condition of psychology as a science: 
Psychologists are simply, on an absolute scale, dullards. … They seem to feel, 
many of them, that all we need to do is consolidate our scientific gains. Their 
self-confidence astonishes me.  For these gains seem to me puny, and scientific 
psychology seems to me ill-founded. At any time the whole psychological 
applecart might be upset. Let them beware! (Gibson, 1967, p. 142; see also 
Gibson, 1985, p. 22). 
In a review of Gibson’s 1966 book, Edwin Boring, a leading figure in American 
psychology, complained about “his many rude inconoclasms” (Boring, 1967, p. 154). 
Nevertheless, far from rejecting Gibson’s work, Boring came to the following glowing 
conclusion: 
Certainly, Gibson’s volume is the most original work we have had in the field of 
sense-perception for a long, long time. … the details invite dissent, and the 
progress of civilization depends, of  course, on the interaction of dissents. 
(Boring, 1967, p. 154.) 
Historically, Gibson’s status within psychology was indeed unique. On the one hand, 
Gibson “‘defied the crowd’ more profoundly than any other psychologist of his 
generation” (Neisser, 2002, p. 164). On the other hand, despite defying the crowd, he, 
like Neisser, somehow remained a dissident insider. 
GIBSON AND THE TEXTBOOKS 
Over the years, we have been pointing out to one another the strange – sometimes, 
very strange – things that the textbook writers have had to say about Gibson. For 
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THE 'TEXTBOOK GIBSON' 
some time, we regarded these misrepresentations as isolated aberrations, but 
eventually came to notice a more consistent pattern. From that point on, we have 
carefully examined every textbook we could obtain (118 in total, including successive 
editions; for a full list of references, see Supplementary Materials). 
The simplest way, of course, for the textbook writers to deal with dissident figures would be 
simply to ignore them. In the case of Gibson, this has seldom happened: 94% of the 
textbooks we have inspected refer to his work.i 
Another option would be to acknowledge his existence, but then immediately dismiss him, as 
has sometimes been the case in the more specialized literature: 
[Gibson] did for perception what Skinner did for animal learning: he 
handicapped a generation of workers by his blinkered and oversimplified 
approach. (Sutherland, 1989, p. 175) 
Outright dismissals of this kind are exceedingly rare in the introductory textbooks (but see 
Styles, 2005, p. 67). Gibson is consistently presented as offering an important alternative 
theoretical perspective, if one with a limited domain of validity. There are, however, two big 
problems.  The first is the attribution to Gibson of theoretical positions that he himself 
emphatically rejected. The second is that the textbooks, almost without exception, fail to 
explain what was really distinctive about Gibson’s alternative approach and, indeed, the 
reasons why he thought such an alternative was essential. 
ASSIMILATING GIBSON TO THE MAINSTREAM 
The textbook writers have had great difficulty making sense of Gibson’s alternative 
approach, and occasionally come up with their own very strange solutions. For 
example, in their account of Gibson’s explanation of shape constancy, Philipchalk and 
McConnell (1994, p. 105) claim that Gibson thought that the eye itself corrected 
optically for perspectival foreshortening. Carlson, Martin and Buskist  (2004, p. 189), in 
their discussion of Gibson’s theory of affordances, argue that “some affordances may 
not be able to afford” (a curious proposal they unfortunately credit to Costall, 1995). 
The following account of Gibson must surely be the most unhelpful summary for 
students unfamiliar with his life’s work: 
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Gibson suggested that human beings can not be directly aware of their physical 
worlds. ...  The actual sensory inputs are often far too degraded to be able to 
specify external scenes and objects ...  (Taylor, 1999, pp. 588-589; emphasis 
added). 
Our concern is not with such idiosyncratic readings of Gibson, but with the remarkably 
consistent way that most of the textbook writers have tried to make their own sense of 
Gibson by assimilating his work to traditional theoretical schemes he had worked so 
hard to undermine. 
Before we go into detail, we will first note some general features of how the textbooks 
deal with Gibson. Very few of the textbooks in their treatment of Gibson’s approach to 
perception include references beyond Gibson’s own books, either supportive or critical. 
He is usually treated as an essentially isolated figure.  Furthermore, there are hardly 
even any quotations from Gibson’s own writings to support the claims made on his 
behalf. Our concern, however, is with another consistent feature of the ‘Textbook 
Gibson’, the striking similarities among different authors in how they mispresent 
Gibson. 
GIBSON, THE ‘CUE THEORIST’ 
Throughout his work, Gibson was challenging the long established assumption that 
perception is inevitably based upon unreliable “perceptual cues” which are only 
probabilistically related to the world. In his early work, Gibson proposed that there 
exist “higher-order variables” on the retina that are structured by the various surfaces 
in the world, especially the ground surface, in such a way that these variables specify 
properties of the world in a consistent and lawful way.  According to Gibson, one of 
the basic problems with “cue theories” was that, even though they are very effective 
at explaining how perceivers make mistakes, they provide no coherent account of 
perceptual success, such as a pilot smoothly landing an airplane.  Cue theory 
assumes that the information available is always inherently impoverished, so that 
perceivers must resort to inferences in order to ‘go beyond’ the available information.  
But, as Gibson argued, cue theory fails to explain the source of the additional 
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THE 'TEXTBOOK GIBSON' 
information that is supposed to support these inferences, since the past experience of 
the individual - or the species - is, by the very terms of the theory, as precarious as 
present experience. 
As an alternative to cue theory, Gibson developed his so-called “Perceptual 
Psychophysics”, an explicit attempt to reinstate stimulus-response theory, by 
redefining both the stimulus and response in a relational, non-atomistic way (see 
Hochberg, 1957). 
The textbook writers were quick to catch up with the appearance of Gibson’s first 
book, The perception of the visual world (Gibson, 1950), and their comments were 
generally positive, and well informed (Hilgard, 1953, p. 310; Hebb, 1958, p. 199; 
Krech & Crutchfield, 1958, p. 154). Krech and Crutchfield also rightly emphasize that 
Gibson’s “higher-order variables” of stimulation, such as texture gradients, constitute 
an “adequate stimulus”, in contrast to the unreliable cues of traditional theory, (Krech 
& Crutchfield, 1958, pp. 153-154). 
Hebb’s 1958 textbook is one of the clearest in explaining the role of textured surfaces, 
including the ground, in structuring the light available to perceivers. However, although Hebb 
includes relevant figures from Gibson’s first book, he gives no indication that this emphasis 
upon surface texture was initiated by Gibson himself, or that Gibson was trying to provide a 
serious alternative to cue theory. In fact, Hebb’s textbook is one of the first to assimiliate 
Gibson’s “higher-order variables” to traditional cue theory. 
In fact, except when one is dealing with objects flying or floating in the air, all one’s 
judgments concern objects that are connected with (supported by) extended surfaces 
such as the ground, walls of buildings, ceilings, and so on; and these background 
surfaces have a most important influence on depth perception.  As they extend away 
from us, they show as gradients of visual texture, the units into which the surface is 
divided .. and the irregularities within the units ... .  These provide cues to the 
direction of slope of the surface, with respect to the line of vision, and thus provide 
cues to the size and distance of objects close to or touching the surfaces (Fig, 68). 
(Hebb, 1958, pp. 194-195; emphasis added) 
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THE 'TEXTBOOK GIBSON' 
The textbook writers love lists, and one of the perennial lists - along with Piaget’s 
developmental stages - concerns the various “cues” to depth perception.  Many textbooks, 
even those that include no explicit account of Gibson’s theory (e.g. Kimble & Garmezy, 
1963; Levine, 2000), incorporate his proposed texture gradients and gradients of retinal flow 
to their list of cues.  Since the 1960s, the general line taken in the textbooks, either explicitly 
or implicitly, is that Gibson was a cue theorist: 
Gibson (1950, 1966) has done more than anyone else to emphasize the importance 
of the physical cues in perceptual phenomena … . (Lindsay & Norman, 1977, pp. 52-
53; emphasis added)  
Why is depth perception so easy?  Clearly, a rich array of depth cuesii is 
available to one or to both eyes - especially when we're moving about (Gibson, 
1979).  But how do we know how to interpret these cues? (Kassin, 2004, p. 
114; see also Davey, 2004, p. 188) 
Furthermore, as the following examples illustrate, even when the textbooks attempt to 
explain how Gibson’s approach differs from the standard accounts based upon inferences 
from uncertain cues, they still go on to misrepresent him instead as a cue or inference-based 
theorist, albeit a non-standard one: 
The great nineteenth-century scientist Hermann von Helmholtz suggested that 
many perceptual integrations reflect unconscious inference. ... More recent 
investigators, notably James J. Gibson (1950, 1966), have pointed out that a 
total stimulus pattern at any time usually contains enough information to make 
these inferences or unconscious calculations. (Mussen & Rosenzweig, 1973, 
p. 577).
… Gibson explained depth perception in terms of cues, such as texture gradient and
motion parallax, picked up from optic flow.  ...  Whereas direct perception theorists 
believe that these cues are picked up directly from the visual array, constructivists 
would suggest that they are learned through past experience with objects around us. 
(Cardwell, Clark & Meldrum, 2004 p. 232; emphasis added) 
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The following textbook manages to present Gibson as a cue theorist and yet also offering a 
distinct alternative: 
So far we have described the cues that allow the perceptual system to infer depth.  
The fact that we are not aware of these inferences has led to the idea, which can be 
traced back at least as far as Helmholtz before 1900, that these inferences are 
unconscious.  Consistent with this view [sic], Gibson (e.g. 1950, 1986) claimed that 
people do not infer depth, but rather perceive it directly.  His idea is that … perception 
involves a direct sensitivity to higher-order invariants. (Medin, Ross, & Markman, 
2001, p. 90; emphases added) 
The attempt by Gleitman (1991) to assimilate Gibson to existing approaches lurches over 
several pages. He first identifies Gibson as a standard cue theorist (pp. 202-203).  Later, 
however, he characterizes him as a nativist for rejecting cues in favour of “higher-order 
patterns of stimulation to which the organism is innately sensitive” (p. 231; emphasis 
added).  Finally, Gleitman concedes that the situation is even more complicated since 
Gibson’s position “is not necessarily tied up with … the nature-nurture issue” (p. 231-232)! 
In short, there is a wide consensus among the textbooks (40%) that Gibson must 
have been a cue theorist, and this includes the most recent textbooks. Even 
textbooks presenting relatively sound accounts of Gibson’s concept of direct 
perception, nevertheless retain the language of cues: “According to Gibson we often 
observe depth cues” (Sternberg, & Mio, 2009, p. 101). It is important to note that the 
different misrepresentations of Gibson to be found in the textbooks are not mutually 
exclusive. For example, the claim that Gibson emphasized “bottom-up perceptual 
cues” (Bernstein, Penner, Clarke-Stewart, & Roy, 2008, p. 187) misrepresents him on 
two counts, not only as a cue theorist but, as we will now explain, also as a bottom-up 
theorist. 
GIBSON, THE STIMULUS-RESPONSE OR BOTTOM-UP THEORIST 
Gibson’s early theory was a resolute attempt to develop a stimulus-response account of 
perceiving without the need to invoke intervening processes of inference, computation, 
construction, or representation.  However, by the time of his second book, The senses 
considered as perceptual systems, Gibson (1966) had come to regard stimulus-response 
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thinking within psychology as fundamentally misguided.  As he had already pointed out in his 
first book, much of the variation in perceptual stimulation comes about because of our own 
movements.  We hardly ever remain still: 
The normal human being, however, is active. … If he is not walking or driving a 
car or looking from a train or airplane, his ordinary adjustments of posture will 
produce some change in the position of his eyes in space. Such changes will 
modify the retinal images in a quite specific way. (Gibson, 1950, p. 117; 
emphasis added) 
Gibson’s work on active touch (Gibson, 1962) nicely exemplifies his emphasis upon 
the primacy of activity in perceiving in general: “The active senses … are analogous 
to tentacles and feelers” (Gibson, 1966, p. 5). Gibson could not have been more clear 
about his rejection of S-R theory: “percepts are not responses to stimuli” (Gibson, 
1975/1982, p. 411). 
In his second book, Gibson (1966) redefined all of the senses functionally rather than 
anatomically, as active interrelated organs of exploration, supported by a basic orienting 
system.  The perceptual systems, so defined, do not “receive” but “obtain” information.  
Global optic flow, for example, is not a “stimulus”, since it is brought about through our 
moving around in the world.  Gibson’s rejection of stimulus-response thinking was thus a 
fundamental departure not only from existing approaches to perception, but from the dualism 
within much of psychological theory more generally, based, as it is, on a dualism of an active 
mind versus a passive body (see Costall, 2006). 
Several textbooks correctly explain Gibson’s emphasis upon activity (e.g. Munn, Fernald, & 
Fernald, 1969, p. 176; Buss, 1973, p. 158; Bruce & Green, 1985, p. 197). However, the 
majority of the textbooks not only ignore Gibson’s outright rejection of stimulus-response 
theory, but also present him, instead, as the foremost proponent of such an approach in its 
extreme, non-mediational, form.  Gibson’s theory is presented as essentially passive, as a 
pure stimulus-response theory, or else, as in the more recent textbooks, as a “bottom-up 
theory”. 
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An influential and contoversial theorist ... is James Gibson (904-1980) [sic], whose 
theory of direct perception truly defines the bottom-up approach. (Sternberg, 
2003, p. 127) 
The theories of Marr, Gibson and Selfridge are all what we call bottom-up theories 
of perception. In other words, they explain perception by starting with the visual 
stimulus and its effects on the nerve cell of the visual system and piecing it 
together.’ (Hayes, 1998, p. 31; see also, Stillings, Weisler, Chase, Feinstein, 
Garfield, & Rissland, 1995, p. 464; Taylor, 1999, p. 588; Solso, 2001, p. 111; 
Cardwell, Clark, & Meldrum, 2004, p. 217; Davey, 2004, p. 195; c.f. Eysenck & 
Keane, 2000, p. 58)  
The characterization of Gibson as an essentially passive theorist is not restricted to the 
general textbooks. Successive editions of Richard Gregory’s Eye and brain have 
portrayed Gibson as a passive theorist. In fact, this text, which first appeared in 1966, is 
the most likely source of this widespread misrepresentation of Gibson’s theory. The 
following passage comes from the fifth edition: 
.... the kind of approach to vision which is developed in this book ... may be 
called an indirect and active account.  ... The alternative - that perceptions are 
directly from the external world - was argued most strongly by the American 
psychologist James J. Gibson (1904-1979), at Cornell University.  ...  Gibson's 
essentially passive account is very different from the notion in this book, that 
perceptions are constructed hypotheses. (Gregory, 1997, p. 9) 
The misrepresentation of Gibson as a bottom-up theorist in the textbooks is 
not only relatively extensive (23%) but is also to be found in the most recent 
editions (e.g. Bernstein et al., 2008, p. 187). Gibson was neither a bottom-up 
nor a top-down theorist. Given his emphasis upon the senses as active 
systems of exploration, as “feelers”, he was, if anything, a bottom-down 
theorist. 
GIBSON, THE NATIVIST THEORIST 
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Both Eleanor and James Gibson were very dismissive of preformationist accounts of 
perceptual development based on the concepts of preprogramming or hard-wiring. As 
Eleanor Gibson put it, clearly the infant “must be equipped by nature with systems that make 
detection of the information possible, but to call such structures rules or logic or computing 
mechanisms sends one along the information processors' road of speculation, and not the 
road of biology” (E. J. Gibson, 1985, p. 75; see also E. J. Gibson, 1999, p. 136, on Fodor’s 
nativism). 
Both James and Eleanor Gibson rejected what they called “enrichment theories” either 
based upon individual experience or innate knowledge. Instead, the Gibsons were arguing 
that in a world rich in available information, the problem for the perceiver was not to “add” 
something to insufficient cues, but rather to learn to differentiate between available 
informative structures (J.J. Gibson & E.J. Gibson, 1955, pp. 33-4). 
Several of the early textbooks include some discussion of the Gibsons’ emphasis upon 
perceptual learning.  They also rightly explain that in rejecting “enrichment” theories of 
learning, the Gibsons were not thereby committed to nativism. For the Gibsons, the extent to 
which perception was unlearned was an open question, and “might be expected to 
depend on the degree of maturity of the infant at birth, which in turn depends on his 
species and on the kind of environment the young of his species have been 
confronted with during evolution” (Gibson, 1966, pp. 266-267). 
However, by the 1990s, the textbook writers had reached a wide consensus that James 
Gibson must be a nativist (for exceptions see Best, 1989, pp. 102-103; Eysenck, 1993, p. 
25; Gleitman, 1981, p. 248; Gleitman, 1983, pp. 159-160).  As in the other cases of the 
misinterpretation we have discussed so far, the textbooks present no quotations from 
Gibson’s work to support their claims, nor any arguments to justify them.  The point is simply 
asserted. 
One version of ‘Gibson, the nativist theorist’ is based on the claim that he believed that 
perceiving was primarily if not exclusively innate, in the sense of present at birth: 
Gibson assumed that most perceptual learning has occurred during the 
history of mankind, and so does not need to occur during the 
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individual's lifetime.  However, we have to learn which affordances will 
satisfy particular goals, and we need to learn to attend to the 
appropriate aspects of the visual environment.  (Eysenck & Keane, 
2000, p. 59; emphasis added.) 
...  the Gestalt psychologists believed that perception was quite 
automatic, requiring little learning.  ... more recent theorists (e.g. 
Gibson, 1979) also propose that many aspects of perception, 
particularly the elements of depth perception called texture gradients, 
are unlearned and automatic to all humans with normally functioning 
visual systems.  (Bell, Greene, Fisher, & Baum, 1996, pp. 70-71; 
emphasis added; see also Davey, 2004, p. 303) 
There is also wide agreement among the textbook writers that James Gibson was 
indeed committed to nativism in the more specific theoretical sense that the role of 
experience is assumed not to be formative, but merely supportive, triggering 
preformed, hard-wired structures: 
Gibson (1979) thought that in the real world sufficient contextual 
information is usually available to make perceptual judgments, including 
those regarding shapes.  He believed that we use this contextual 
information directly; in essence, we are prewired to respond to it. 
(Sternberg, 1995, p. 170) 
According to the theory of direct perception, both the understanding of 
depth cues [sic] and the meaning of falling off a cliff are native 
endowments of the human species.  (Westen, 1996, p. 163.) 
According to the Gibsonian Approach, your brain is "hard-wired" to 
see the world as it is. …   Gibson believed there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between sensory inputs and perceptual experiences, 
and that this correspondence is determined by the genes. (Philipchalk, 
& McConnell, 1994, p. 105; see also Simons, Irwin, & Drinnin, 1987, p. 
126; (Dworetzky, 1988, p. 119; Maitland, 2010, p. 91.) 
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As we have explained, Eleanor and James Gibson argued out that both the 
nativists and empiricists failed to explain the source of the prior knowledge that 
was supposed to supplement the available perceptual information. However, 
they had a further reason for rejecting the idea that perceiving and acting could 
be completely pre-programmed. Not only are our own bodies and action 
capacities subject to change over time, but also the situations we encounter 
never remain the same.  Organisms therefore have to be flexibly attuned to the 
specific contingencies of any particular situation, something that no amount of 
preprogramming could ever achieve (see also Brooks, 1991; Reed, 1996; 
Shaw, 2003). 
In several textbook accounts, this crucial point about the need for perceivers to be 
flexibly attuned to their specific situation is actually directed against Gibson, and 
deemed to place severe limits upon his own theoretical approach: 
… Gibson's theory … works best for innately programmed reactions to aspects
of the natural environment, as when a bee finds its way back to the hive or a fish 
swims in water.  … The trouble with these kinds of interactions with the 
environment is that they are stereotyped.  (Green, 1990, p. 518.) 
[Gibson’s approach] seems more suitable as an explanation of innately 
preprogrammed reactions to environmental circumstances.  The visual array 
triggers stereotyped activity directly.  A wasp buzzes against a closed window 
pane in reaction to a total visual environment. (Malim & Birch, 1998, p. 270-271; 
see also Taylor, 1999, p. 589-590.) 
Bruce and Green’s textbook on visual perception, first published in 1985, is the 
probable source of these later strikingly similar accounts. Yet Bruce and Green were 
not claiming that Gibson was a nativist, nor that his theory had no relevance to human 
perception.  They were discussing his concept of affordances, and the role of 
conceptual knowledge in our understanding of things: 
The Gibsonian concept of affordance ... is at its most powerful in the context of 
simple visually-guided behaviour such as that of insects.  Here it does indeed 
make sense to speak of the animal detecting the information available in the 
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light which is needed to organise its activities, and the notion of conceptual 
representation of the environment seems redundant. 
For more intelligent creatures, and for people, we can make the same kind of 
argument about detection of distance, falling-off places and so on in the 
guidance of locomotion. (Bruce, & Green, 1985, p. 322; see also Bruce & 
Green, 1990, p. 390). 
Overall, a sizeable minority of the textbooks (26%) continue to misrepresent him as an 
unqualified nativist, and sometimes in remarkably similar terms. This, however, is 
mainly a development since the 1990s. The earlier textbooks do correctly present his 
emphasis upon learning as the basis of perceptual differentiation. 
THE 1979 GIBSON 
In recent years, the textbooks have mainly taken Gibson’s last book, The ecological 
approach to visual perception, as the definitive statement of his theoretical position (Gibson, 
1979).  Yet, the main features of his final theory were already in place. He had already 
rejected his early stimulus-response or “psychophysical” approach to perception, and 
developed most of the concepts presented in the 1979 book (e.g. Gibson, 1966), such as 
the senses as active perceptual systems, the optic array and optic flow, and visual 
proprioception.  Gibson described his last book as a “sequel” (Gibson, 1979, p. 1) to his first 
book (Gibson, 1979), and, as such, it retains some of the same limitations: an exclusive 
emphasis on vision, and an awkward switching between discussions of surface perception 
and of the perception of ‘meaning’. (In Gibson’s first book, “direct perception”, or what he 
then called “literal perception” was restricted to the perception of surface characteristics.) 
Perhaps, the most distinctive aspect of Gibson’s last book was the concept of “affordances” 
– the meanings of things for our actions.iii Gibson’s account of affordances involves two
claims.  The first is that such meanings can be “directly perceived”: that there is information 
available that specifies the affordances of things. Gibson regarded this first claim as the 
most important, even though it clearly presupposes a second, more fundamental, claim: that 
affordances exist in the world, although in relation to the animal in question: 
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The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it 
provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. [...] I mean by it something 
that refers to both the environment and the animal in a way that no 
existing term does.  It implies the complementarity of the animal and the 
environment." (Gibson 1979, p. 127.) 
The relational character of affordances is widely misunderstood as concerning 
the animal as a perceiver, whereas, for Gibson, the relation ultimately 
concerns the animal as an agent: 
[Affordances] have unity relative to the posture and behavior of the 
animal being considered.  So an affordance cannot be measured as we 
measure in physics. (Gibson 1979, pp. 127-128; emphasis added) 
Putting meaning back into the world in this way was a fundamental move on Gibson’s part, 
and challenged a long tradition within Western thought that has placed meaning exclusively 
within the realm of the mental, as a purely subjective quality. 
Many of the recent textbooks make some reference to the concept of affordances, but 
seldom mention or explore its deeper theoretical implications.  Most of them approvingly 
note that the concept reflects Gibson’s “real-world” emphasis, and his insistence upon the 
biological significance of perception as a basis for our activity and survival in the world, even 
when they reject his basic theoretical approach (Styles, 2005, p. 67). 
Many of the textbooks do discuss Gibson’s claim that affordances can be directly perceived, 
but then conclude that this claim is restricted to relatively simple activities, and must be 
based on innate mechanisms, as in the various accounts about bees and birds that we have 
already cited. None of the introductory textbooks seriously explains or critically examines the 
wider philosophical implications of the concept of affordances as a challenge to dualistic 
thinking within psychological theory (see Costall, 1995; Heft, 2001). 
GIBSON AS A ‘COMPLEMENTARY THEORIST’ 
This article has been concerned with how the textbooks deal with dissidence, and we chose 
James Gibson as our case study since he was not only a dissident, challenging the 
accepted foundations of psychological theory, but also remained widely respected within the 
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discipline.  For the best part of his long career, Gibson was trying to move beyond many of 
the dualisms that continue to structure modern thought: mind vs body; subject vs. object; 
person vs. world; and knower vs. known.  His contributions were both critical and 
constructive.  He presented a fundamental critique of traditional psychological theory, but 
also sought to develop a new theoretical approach that would overcome the standard 
dualisms. Gibson regarded his new approach as having wider implications for psychological 
theory: “The redefinition of perception implies a redefinition of the so-called higher mental 
processes” (Gibson, 1979, p. 255).iv 
In an article on “Gibson’s revolution,” Neisser warned of the dangers of trying to assimilate 
dissidents within psychology to existing schemes, and he had neither Gibson as the target 
nor the textbook writers as the possible perpetrators solely in mind: 
Perhaps more than scientists in other fields, psychologists believe that there is 
nothing new under the sun.  ... Accustomed to this pattern, we try to understand each 
"new" proposal by mapping it on to some existing scheme.  When an idea is really 
new, that strategy fails. (Neisser, 1990, p. 749) 
As we have already seen, Gibson’s work has been assimilated to probabilistic, inference-
based cue theory; stimulus-response and bottom-up theory; and the appeal to ‘hard-wiring’ 
and the innate pre-programming of development.v Ironically, despite his own warning about 
assimilation, Neisser’s influential Cognition and reality (1976) set the pattern for another 
version of the ‘Textbook Gibson’, where Gibson’s approach is presented as a complement to 
traditional theory, rather than a radical alternative. 
Neisser (1976, p. xii) did admit that his proposed synthesis was a matter of some “dismay” to 
both James and Eleanor Gibson, but it has been enthusiastically taken up by the textbooks. 
According to this synthesis, Gibson’s direct perception is just a component of a more 
inclusive “perceptual cycle” that also involves a constructivist component. Benjafield’s 
textbook (1997, p. 31) explicitly refers to Neisser’s attempt at reconciliation: "Neisser 
integrated information processing psychology with Gibson's theory of direct visual 
perception," and even presents an account of Neisser’s synthesis before going into the 
details of Gibson’s own approach (see also Best, 1989, p. 108; Davenport 1996, p. 233). 
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Later, Neisser (1992) came to talk of two distinct modes of perception, the Gibsonian and 
the constructivist, and the textbooks duly followed: 
It is entirely possible, of course, that perceptual development involves both 
differentiation and enrichment.  Which process is used presumably depends on 
the quality of stimulus information.  Complex visual stimuli presented for a long 
period of time in bright light require perceptual differentiation for accurate 
perception, whereas visual stimuli presented very briefly in dim light need 
perceptual enrichment. (Eysenck, 1993, p. 25; see also, Gross & McIlveen, 
1998, p. 188; Gross, 1996, p. 217.) 
While direct perception may help us in understanding some of the early 
perception of sensory impressions, the constructive-perception theory is useful 
in understanding how sensory impressions are comprehended by the thinking 
brain. (Solso, 2001, p. 112.) 
Most perception theorists (including Gregory, Marr, and Biederman) have 
focused on perception for recognition, whereas Gibson emphasised perception 
for action.  (Eysenck & Keane, 2000, p. 62; see also Robinson-Riegler & 
Robinson-Riegler, 2004, pp. 93-94) 
There is now a wide consensus that Gibson’s approach complements traditional 
constructivist theory, and this is growing trend. As many as 35% of the textbooks we 
have examined present Gibson not as a dissident but as a complement to mainstream 
theory. 
ASSIMILATING DISSIDENCE 
Attempts at theoretical synthesis are not in themselves, of course, unreasonable.  But, 
in the case of dissident figures, such as Gibson, assimilation can be deeply misleading 
about the nature of a discipline if the textbooks fail to set out the reasons why the 
dissidents themselves were convinced (rightly or wrongly) that such reconciliation 
could not work. 
Page 20 of 34
20 
Theory and Psychology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
THE 'TEXTBOOK GIBSON' 
And this brings us to what we regard as the most important problem with the 
‘Textbook Gibson.’  Not all the textbooks we have consulted are misleading in the 
sense of including outright mistakes.  Some of the accounts are careful and 
informative.  But the introductory textbooks are selective in the following sense. Just a 
few of the textbooks do acknowledge that Gibson was “an influential and controversial 
theorist” (Sternberg, 2009, p. 101), and that he regarded the constructivist approach 
as “completely wrong headed” (Quinlan & Dyson, 2008, p. 215), but even these 
textbooks do not provide any serious explanation of the reasons for Gibson’s 
challenge to mainstream psychology. The rest remain silent. In short, students 
reading these texts are spared the disturbing details about why one of psychology’s 
most eminent figures had deep misgivings about the conceptual foundations of 
psychology as a science. The “Textbook Gibson” is, therefore, an important example 
of how disciplines can ‘rehabilitate’ their eminent dissidents by acknowledging their 
existence, assimilating their work to existing schemas, and ignoring their dissidence. 
This avoidance of controversy in the psychology textbooks would seem to go back a 
long way in psychology: “Textbooks are not, of course, the place to discuss such 
subjects” (de Laguna, 1918, p. 617).  
William James was himself an early dissident, and also a crucial influence upon 
Gibson (see Heft, 2001).  His student textbook, The briefer course, begins with the 
following reassurance, directed, no doubt, not so much at his student readers but at 
their instructors: 
In preparing the following abridgement of my larger work, the Principles of 
Psychology, my chief aim has been to make it more directly available for class-
room use. … I have left out all the polemical and historical matter, all the 
metaphysical discussions and purely speculative passages, … and (I trust) all 
the impertinences of the larger work. (James, 1892, p. iii) 
By the end of his textbook, William James could, however, no longer contain himself: 
When, then, we talk of 'psychology as a natural science,' we must not assume 
that that means a sort of psychology that stands at last on solid ground. It 
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means just the reverse; it means a psychology particularly fragile, and into 
which the waters of metaphysical criticism leak at every joint, a psychology all 
of whose elementary assumptions and data must be reconsidered in wider 
connections and translated into other terms. ...  This is no science, it is only the 
hope of a science. (James, 1892, p. 467-468). 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, we have been concerned with the assimilation of dissidence by the 
textbook writers. We would like to end, therefore, with some advice to future 
dissidents. In the light of the early precedent set by William James and the fate of the 
“Textbook Gibson”:  (1) Write your own textbooks (if the publishers will let you!), and 
(2) subvert the downright carelessness and intellectual cowardice of this well-
established scientific genre. 
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i
 There is no consistent pattern across successive editions of the same textbook 
concerning whether James Gibson is included or not. The different editions of the 
Hilgard textbook shift from sometimes extensive treatments of Gibson to no mention 
at all. Eleanor Gibson, in contrast, is routinely cited in the textbooks, initially in relation 
to her work on perceptual learning, and later in relation to her research on the visual 
cliff (e.g. E. J. Gibson & Walk, 1960).  Yet they seldom explain that James and 
Eleanor Gibson were married, and also involved in a joint project. 
ii
 Bold font in the original. This font is widely used in the textbooks to indicate key 
terms. 
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iii
 In fact, Gibson had already introduced the concept of affordances in this second 
book (Gibson, 1966, pp. 273-274), and it is also anticipated in a remarkable chapter 
on “meaning” in his first book (Gibson, 1950, e.g. p. 198). 
iv
 Gibson also regarded his ecological approach as a conceptual contribution to the 
new environmental movement (Gibson, 1979, p. 2), but this concern has hardly been 
reflected in the subsequent research within ecological psychology. 
v
 On the face of it, the persistence and level of such misrepresentations within the 
introductory textbooks is puzzling.  The introductory textbooks are now a dominant and 
lucrative aspect of psychological publishing, and there is extensive vetting of such products 
by teams of referees prior to publication. Furthermore, the textbooks, once published, are 
then subject to book reviews.  In many cases, the textbooks go on to appear in several 
editions and so are open to later correction, and yet these misrepresentations are still 
repeated (or else, as we have seen, become increasingly garbled).  Finally, it is surely odd 
that those teaching psychology courses do not themselves take more care to check the 
quality of the relatively expensive texts they are recommending to their students.    
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